EBOOK Scope of Autonomy:Kant and the Morality of Freedom

Katerina Deligiorgi offers a contemporary defence of autonomy that is Kantian in        orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality,        and practical reasoning. Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy        with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed        view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately        captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness        toreasons.The theory defended in The Scope of Autonomy is distinctive in two        respects. First, whereas autonomy has primarily been understood in terms of our        relation to ourselves, Deligiorgi shows that it also centrally involves our relation        to others. Identifying the intersubjective dimension of autonomy is crucial for the        defence of autonomy as a morality of freedom. Second, autonomy must be treated as a        composite concept and hence not capturable in simple definitions such as acting on        one'shigher order desires or on principles one endorses. One of the virtues of the        composite picture is that it shows autonomy lying at the intersection of concerns        with morality, practical rationality, and freedom. Autonomy pertains to all these        areas, though it does not exactly coincide with any of them. Provingthis, and so        tracing the scope of autonomy, is therefore essential: Deligiorgi shows that        autonomy is theoretically plausible, psychologically realistic, and morally        attractive.